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I have never seen the Republic referred to as a treatise on rhetoric, nor is it the 
first, or the second, place one would look for a Platonic account of the concept 
of persuasion. We are fortunate to possess the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, where 
the art of rhetoric is treated at length, although ἡ λόγων τέχνη must compete 
for the title of primary subject in both works. Disregarding the question of art, 
the concept of ‘λόγος’ receives its fair share of attention in both the Theaetetus 
and the Sophist. In the Republic the art of persuasion works in subtler ways, 
but it still plays an important role, as I hope to show presently.
My point of departure is the concept of persuasion (πειθώ). I shall briefly 
consider the boundaries of the concept as employed in the Republic before I 
attempt to connect the concept itself with the education of the guardians by 
way of the notion of cultivation.
In the Gorgias, Socrates makes a distinction between two forms of 
persuasion: one will produce belief (πίστις) without knowledge, and the other 
will in fact produce knowledge (ἐπιστήμη); in the latter sense, ‘to persuade’ 
(πείθειν) is synonymous with ‘to teach’ (διδάσκειν), while ‘to be persuaded’ 
(πείθεσθαι) equals ‘to learn’ (μανθάνειν) (Grg. 454c7–5a7). The distinction is 
repeated in the Theaetetus, the only difference being that ‘belief’ is exchanged 
for ‘opinion’ (δόξα).1 The Gorgias is not concerned with elaborating on this 
distinction through an exploration of the nature of knowledge or the difference 
between knowledge and belief, while the Theaetetus, as we know, does not 
succeed in defending a definition of knowledge, even though it is precisely 
this division within the category of persuasion which leads Socrates to discard 
the second definition and Theaetetus to propose the third and final definition: 
true opinion based on logos (μετὰ λόγου ἀληθὴς δόξα).2
We stumble across a similar categorization of persuasion – although 
more or less incidentally – in Resp. 3.412e5–13c4, during the separation of 
the guardians proper from the auxiliary guard. Socrates tries to illustrate the 
different ways in which opinion may exit someone’s thought (διάνοια). The 
only voluntary exit occurs when false opinion is changed by way of learning 
1 Tht. 201a4–c7. Similarly we find δοξάζειν instead of πιστεύειν. Since the reference to persuasion is 
made during a discussion of δόξα and the proposed definition of ἐπιστήμη as δόξα ἀληθής, it would be silly 
to read much into this difference.
2 The distinction is also alluded to in Pl. Plt. 304b1–d10 and Phdr. 277e5–8a5.
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(μεταμανθάνειν). Involuntary loss of opinion befalls true opinion in particular,3 
and there are three possible ways this can happen:
1. Theft:4 Opinion is removed by stealth, in one of two ways:
 a. Persuasion (μεταπείθειν) through the agency of speech (λόγος),
 b. Forgetting (ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι) through the agency of time (χρόνος).
2. Violence: Pain makes one change one’s opinion.
3. Sorcery: This category comprises change of opinion in those who are:
 a. Spellbound by pleasure,
 b. Seized by fear.
Although voluntary change through learning is not referred to as a form of 
πειθώ in this passage, it is easy to recognize that this way of changing opinion 
corresponds to epistemic persuasion in Grg. and Tht. Of the involuntary 
modes only 1a is entitled persuasion, and the question is whether this category 
is congruous with the ‘pistic’ form of persuasion in Grg. It all depends on what 
– and how much – one reads into the qualification ‘by stealth’ (λανθάνειν). 
There is a difference between being unaware of changing one’s opinion and 
being ignorant of exactly how one was induced to change it. If one is unable 
to render account of one’s change of heart, even if the change is for the better, 
Socrates would hardly consider it a case of ‘learning’. Moreover, although it is 
presented as a form of involuntary change, being unable to prove the rational 
basis for one’s conviction would certainly make it count as involuntary from 
the Socratic perspective, considering the lack of self-transparency, i.e. the lack 
of self-knowledge.
Disregarding the case of memory lapse for now, the categories of violence 
and sorcery are significant in their own right, particularly in relation to a wider 
concept of persuasion than that which is invoked in the category of theft. There 
is no reason to doubt that persuasion is indelibly tied to the medium of logos, 
but logos in the strict sense of speech or argument rests on a more elusive 
foundation. When Aristotle makes his clear distinction between λόγος, ἦθος, 
and πάθος, he emphasizes that these are all modes of persuasion (πίστεις) 
which affect the audience in the medium of speech. By means of speech alone 
3 One could get the impression that Socrates considers false opinion immune to involuntary exit, but there 
is no reason why his categories should not apply equally well to the change from false to true opinion, or to 
the exchange of one false opinion for another. Involuntary loss of false opinion is of no importance in the 
context because the discussion concerns the ability of the potential guardian to hold onto true opinion.
4 In κλαπέντες we can note a toying with the poetic use of this verb in the sense of ‘deception’. That Plato 
intends this becomes quite obvious with Socrates’ confession that τραγικῶς ... κινδυνεύω λέγειν (Resp. 
3.413b4), although this should also be understood as an apology for the use of metaphors. Adam 19632, I, 
191 correctly refers to κεκλέμμεθα in Soph. Ant. 681.
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the speaker can convey an impression of his own character, leading the auditor 
to put more, or less, faith in what he hears regardless of the strength of the 
actual rhetorical syllogism. This attuning of trust is not usually something 
which the auditor is able to account for, and if he is, it is doubtful whether 
his account could ever reach ‘straight to the bottom’, achieving complete 
transparency. Then again, the speaker can construct his speech so as to more 
directly affect the mood of the auditor, raising his spirits or striking fear into 
him. His mood, and his reaction to the perceived character of the speaker, 
will determine the extent to which the auditor is taken in by the speech, what 
weight he puts on particular arguments, strictly speaking, and perhaps even his 
capacity to appreciate argument. The truly good speech leaves the audience 
entranced, spellbound, and captivated.
In all probability, these modes of persuasion are already included in 
category 1a above. The reason he considers pain, pleasure, and fear separately 
is that he has in mind instances where these emotions are not aroused by 
speech, but rather by exposure to bribery (pleasure) and afflictions upon the 
battlefield (pain, fear). Even when they are not conveyed by speech, character 
and passion can lead to involuntary change of opinion. This does not mean 
they are not at work in speech.
It is therefore all the more interesting that violence (βία) and persuasion 
form an inseparable pair of contrasts, popping up throughout the entirety of 
the Republic.5 In a passage from book 8, Socrates describes the psyche of the 
oligarchic person: 
Is it not clear from this that such a person, in other transactions, where he enjoys the 
reputation of being a just man, suppresses other base appetites residing in him by means of 
a so to speak decent act of violence (ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ): that he does not attempt to 
convey though persuasion that it is not the better choice, nor does he cultivate by means of 
words, but through necessity and fear (οὐδ’ ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ), as he is 
himself anxious for his remaining fortune?6
5 Most noticeable are Resp. 3.411d7–e2 and 8.554c11–d3, but the contrast is present at 3.399a5–c4, 
3.403b6, 7. 519e4 and arguably in the passage where Socrates envisages persuading the philosophers to 
return to the cave (7. 520a6–e3). Cf. 2.359c5–6, where βία is applied – but not by Socrates – to νόμος as 
opposed to φύσις.
6 Resp. 8.554c11–d3. Translations are my own, based on the text of Burnet 1900–1907.
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This less-than-honourable display of self-restraint is a fascinating illustration 
of self-cultivation. One is reminded of the vulgar virtue in the Phaedo, where 
desire restrains desire and fear repels fear.7 What is of particular interest here 
is the contrast between two modes of cultivation.
The verb ἡμεροῦν means ‘to make ἥμερος’, ἥμερος being an adjective 
which was applied to ‘tame’ animals and ‘cultivated’ plants. There is, in other 
words, a strong connotation of subduing or bringing under control. But more 
importantly, there is a connotation of organization and society, of cooperation, 
and of a way of being which makes cooperation possible. The opposite 
of ἥμερος is ἄγριος, the wild, the savage, the loner, lacking in shame and 
devoid of respect for others: the lion, the wolf.8 The social sense of ἥμερος 
is effectively illustrated when Socrates in the Phaedo groups together bees, 
wasps, ants, and humans as πολιτικὰ καὶ ἥμερα γένη, to which those who have 
practised the vulgar (δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτική) non-philosophical virtue will 
return via reincarnation.9 In the famous passage in Pol. 1.2 where Aristotle 
proclaims the human being a political animal, the bee, along with ‘every other 
gregarious animal’, is recognized as possessing a lesser share of the political.10 
What renders the human being so outstandingly political is, based on the most 
natural interpretation of the text, its capacity for logos. It is no coincidence that 
logos in the above quote follows immediately after ἡμερῶν, while necessity 
and fear – although dependent on the same verb – are separated in an elliptical 
clause of their own: the latter terms connect only with one half of the concept 
of cultivation.
7 I agree with Adam 19632, II, 228 that this is how we should understand this passage, hence the superiority 
of reading ἐπιεικεῖ τινι as an attribute of βίᾳ, rather than as a self-contained expression (‘a decent element’). 
See Phd. 68b8–9d6, with a description of vulgar σωφροσύνη as appetite conquering appetite at 68e2–9a5, 
and 82c2–4a2, where there is a mention of the money-lover’s fear for his fortune at 82c5–6.
8 The spirited element is likened to a lion in Resp. 9. 588d3–5, harbouring the possibility for savagery, in 
which case the wolf is the more appropriate image (3. 416a2 – b4), or for civilized loyalty in the manner of 
the dog (ibid. cf. 2.376a2–c6). The tyrant is likened to a wolf in 8.565d4–6a5. See ὀφεῶδες at 9.590b1 with 
Adam’s note 19632, II, 365–6. 
9 Phd. 82a10–b9. Also worth noting, with a view to the opposite ἀγριότης, is that 81a3–a6 suggests 
that τούς ... γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων 
καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη [sc. εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι]. In Resp. tyranny, lawlessness (παρανομία, see esp. 4.424d1–5a1, 
9.571a5–2b9), injustice, violence and savagery are intimately connected concepts. In Dem. 21.49 ἥμερος 
is coupled with φιλάνθρωπος, with reference to the Greeks, in spite of experiencing many an injustice at 
the hands of the barbarians, in spite of being born into enmity with them, still forbidding violence against 
(barbarian) slaves. Moreover, the fact that ἡμερότης in Resp. is so obviously associated with σωφροσύνη, 
which is defined in Book 4 as ‘friendship’ between the political classes/psychic elements, further strengthens 
my claim that there is a social connotation to the concept.
10 The image of the bee and the beehive is moreover strongly ingrained in the Republic itself. The 
philosopher rulers are likened to ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας at 7.520b6, and then the hive and, 
more importantly, the drone (κηφήν) is the primary simile employed during the description of degenerate 
regimes and persons in Books 8–9.
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Let us now take a closer look at how this cultivation operates in the 
Platonic soul. In Resp. 3.410a7–12b1, as the education in music and 
gymnastics culminates, all eyes are on ἀγριότης and ἡμερότης, savagery and 
culture. Although these two qualities are initially paired with σκληρότης and 
μαλακία, hardness and softness, at 3.410e1–3 it is made clear that softness 
is the excess corresponding to culture, while savagery seems to be more like 
the raw material for, or the obscure origin of, the mean courage and excess 
hardness (3.410d6–9). Culture is naturally associated with the philosophical 
aspiration of the soul (3.410e1), while savagery originates in the spirited 
element (3.410d6–7). In fact, in Book 9 (588b1–92b6), as the main argument 
of the Republic reaches its climax – a chunk of text which should be read 
in conjunction with this part of Book 3 – the philosophical or ‘logistic’ 
element of the soul is actually referred to as τὸ ἥμερον (9.589d2, 591b3). 
One might say it is the cultured element, since in the same passage Socrates 
also applies this term attributively both to the spirited element and to parts of 
the desiderative element: when a person is punished for an unjust deed, ‘the 
spirited element is calmed and tamed (ἡμεροῦται), while the cultured element 
is set free (ἐλευθεροῦται)’ (9.591b2–3). Two pages earlier, Socrates compared 
the ‘materialist’ desires to a multiform beast with a circle of heads ‘of other 
animals, both wild and tame (ἥμερα)’ (9.588c8–9), before he went on to liken 
the rational element – when it functions at its best – to a farmer ‘nurturing 
and domesticating (τιθασεύων) the cultivated (ἥμερα), while hindering the 
growth of the wild ones’ (9.589b2–3). Whatever the nuance of τιθασός,11 in 
my opinion this apparent ‘doubling’ of cultivation suggests that some desires 
already possess an affinity with the cultured element in the strict sense of the 
word, an affinity which may be further cultivated. As for the members of this 
group, one should refer to the distinction between ‘necessary’ or ‘lucrative’ and 
‘unnecessary’ or ‘wasteful’ desires in 8.558d8–9d3, and the further isolation 
of certain ‘perverse’, ‘lawless’, ‘beastly’ and ‘savage’ desires within the group 
of unnecessary desires at 9.571a5–2b9.
While the notion of culture is explicitly connected with the philosophical 
element in Book 3, the emphasis is on origin: culture springs from the 
philosophical element. But the very point of the education, as is reaffirmed in 
Book 9, is to harmonize the elements. Even if culture and civilization primarily 
11 Chantraine 2009, 1077 has some interesting comments on the application of ἥμερος vs τιθασός, with 
reference to this passage. It is also worth noting that he follows Adam 19632, II, 364 in taking ὥσπερ 
γεωργός as belonging to the following clause, not to the one preceding. Hence ‘il s’agit de plantes’, with 
Shorey 1930–1935, II, 403, but contra Ferrari and Griffith 2000, 309, Grube and Reeve 1997, 1197, Emlyn-
Jones and Preddy 2013, II, 379. In my opinion, the image of the γεωργός loses much of its raison d’être if 
one does not consider the following clause an expansion on the image.
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originate with the capacity to reason, once present they may affect the rest of 
the soul. And when they do, when a man cultivates his own spirit and his 
own desires, or when he educates a child who ‘is not yet able to seize λόγος’ 
(3.402a2), this process of cultivation need not be a matter of force (βία), but 
it can be – and it should be – one of logos and persuasion, πειθὼ διὰ λόγων 
(3.411d8). Not only spirit, but also a certain part of the large, desiderative 
element of the soul, should not simply be repressed, but rather appealed to 
with words. The possibility of this scenario hinges on the fact that although 
the soul may consist of sharply distinct and even contrary ‘parts’, it is qua 
possibility a more or less unified whole. One could even add that it is unified 
with the rest of the ‘logical’ world – how else could a child not yet itself in 
command of logos (cf. 9.590e2–1a4) be amenable to education?
This originary unity is designated throughout with the word ἥμερος. 
It depends on the possibility of communication, which reaches its most 
extreme form in human logos. This logos is not only a medium for outward 
communication, but a basic determination of the human soul. Hence Aristotle 
(Eth. Nic. 1.1102b25–03a3) allows the psychic aspect originally entitled 
alogon a share in logos, in a passage adorned with a string of words which 
evoke the notion of persuasion.12 The same logical relationship of persuasion, 
I contend, is present in the account of the human being in the Republic. 
And just as in Aristotle the practical logos is conceptually inseparable from 
character as seated in desire (ὄρεξις), we may entertain the idea that also in 
Plato’s Republic reason’s capacity for persuading desire rests upon an affinity 
between thought and that aspect of character which is expressed in spirit 
and the lower appetites, with the implication that reason does not enjoy the 
complete conceptual integrity suggested by the digression on philosophy in 
Books 5–7. The affinity reaches perfection in the fully cultivated soul, when all 
the psychic elements are united in the ‘friendship’ that constitutes sophrosyne 
(4.430c8–2b1, 4.442c10–d3), based not on force, but on mutual respect. In 
Kallipolis it may very well be this friendship which in the end persuades the 
philosophers to temper their philosophical eros and return for a while to the 
world of politics and social interaction.
12 πειθαρχεῖ, εὐηκοώτερον, ὁμοφωνεῖ, κατήκοον, πειθαρχικόν, τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων ἔχειν λόγον, 
πείθεται πως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.
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